The Intolerance of Tolerance

"Now, tolerance means that you must not say anybody is wrong. That’s the one wrong thing to say. But, now notice, under this view of tolerance, you are tolerant, not of individuals, you are tolerant of all positions. The tolerance is now directed toward all views that are articulated because you are not in a position to say that any view is wrong

The one thing that is not tolerated is the view that this view of tolerance is wrong.

And thus you have the intolerance of tolerance."

- D.A Carson

The rest after the break

And it’s important to understand that the notion of tolerance within this framework has a certain intellectual heritage that has been transmuted by postmodernism.

Under the modernist paradigm, tolerance looked something like this: I may disagree with you, but I insist on your right to articulate your opinion, however stupid and ignorant I think it is.

That’s tolerance.

In other words, this means there is tolerance for the individual to say things with which I disagree. The tolerance is directed toward individuals. But, there is robust debate at the level of content and substance.

So, I may disagree profoundly with Marxist historiography; but, if I’m a tolerant person under a modernist regime, I insist on the right of the Marxist historiographer to articulate their views. But, likewise, under the Western vision of tolerance and under a modernist camp, I insist on the right of Capitalists to articulate their views, or Theists to articulate their views, or whatever—however right or wrong I think they are. So that unless there is something deeply, deeply damaging to public well-being, as for someone coming along and vociferously advocating pedophilia… then the notion of tolerance allows you to defend almost anybody teaching almost anything.

Because you see, under the modernist paradigm, the assumption is that in the marketplace of disputed ideas, the truth will come out.

There is a truth to be searched out. There is a truth to be pursued.

Truth, ultimately, is desirable and attainable.

So in other words, this view of tolerance is itself tied to a certain kind of vision of truth. A certain kind of epistemology.

But once you change that epistemology, and lose that vision of truth—tolerance itself is redefined.

Now, tolerance means that you must not say anybody is wrong.  That’s the one wrong thing  to say. But, now notice, under this view of tolerance, you are tolerant, not of individuals, you are tolerant of all positions. The tolerance is now directed toward all views that are articulated because you are not in a position to say that any view is wrong.

The one thing that is not tolerated is the view that this view of tolerance is wrong.

And thus you have the intolerance of tolerance.

Worse, if somebody comes along and says this view of tolerance is wrong, under this view of tolerance that person is not tolerant and therefore should not be tolerated.

That person is a bigot.

And because there is no understanding of tolerance directed toward the individual, but only toward all views—except that view that says this view of tolerance is wrong—the university campus can become a very scary place toward anybody who says that there may be an absolute right and wrong afterall. Or there may be an absolute truth.

I would argue that this new view of tolerance is in fact, logically incoherent. I don’t simply mean that it is inconsistent; that is, it proves intolerant. I don’t mean that.  It is inconsistent, but I mean something worse than that. I think that it is incoherent. Because the very notion of tolerance, under whatever regime, presupposes that you have to disagree with someone or something before you tolerate it. You see, if I say, “On my university campus I will tolerate those who propagate Islam, or Marxism, or whatever… ” It doesn’t matter. I have to disagree with them before I can use the word tolerate.

But if I say, “Well, y’know, you’re no more right or wrong than I am. I may agree with you. I tolerate you…”

It’s incoherent. That doesn’t even make sense. To be able to tolerate something, you’ve got to disagree with it in the first place. But if, in fact, you’re not in a position to say that any position is wrong, how can you speak of tolerating it?

Thus, I would argue that the new definition of tolerance is not only inconsistent, but incoherent. And it proves, in fact, to be less tolerant than the brand of tolerance that was around under modernism. Because at the very point where it comes up with that which disagrees with it most, it has to dismiss all opponents as intolerant and bigoted, and therefore becomes, in fact, totalitarian.